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SPECIAL COMMENT
THE DEAD MAN STATUTE AND THE
UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE
RICHARD H. LEEt

The mnpact of the Uniform Rules of Evidence' upon the
Florida legislature and upon legislatures generally has not been
earth-shaking. But if wholesale adoption of the Rules is not to
be accomplished, none the less the Rules will have performed an
extremely valuable service should they merely provide a point of
departure from which we may re-examine the rules of evidence as
they now exist. The vast amount of scholarship which underlies
both the Uniform Rules and their predecessor the Model Code
of Evidence2 entitle them to the greatest respect even though we
may resene the right to differ. In this paper an effort will be made
to re-examine one small segment of our law of evidence, the Dead
Man's Statute,3 in the light of the Uniform Rules and of the
Model Code.
The question of what, if anything, shall be done with the Dead Man's
Statute is raised by the Model Code and the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
and in both, after a fashion, settled by its destruction. But the answer may
not be quite so simple.
The Dead Man's Statute is generally regarded as a vestige of the
old Common Law disqualification for interest. England did away with

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENC. (1953).
2. A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EvIDEMCE (1942).
3. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1955):
Vitnesses; as affected by interest
No person, in any court, or before any officer acting judicially, shall be
excluded from testifying as a witness by reason of his interest in the
event of the action or proceeding, or because he is a party thereto; provided, however, that no party to such action or proceeding, nor any
person interested in the event thereof, nor any person from, through or
tinder whom any such party, or interested person, derives any interest or
title, by assignment or otherwise, shall be examined as a witness in regard
to any transaction or communication between such witness and a person
at the time of such examination deceased, insane or lunatic, against the
executor, or administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee,
devisee or survivor of such deceased person, or the assignee or committee
of such insane person or lunatic; but this prohibition shall not extend to
any transaction or communication as to which any such executor, administrator, heir at law, next of kin, assignee, legatee, devisee, survivor or
committeeman shall be examined on his own behalf, or as to which the
testimony of such deceased person or lunatic shall be given in evidence.
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interest as a disqualification in the middle eighteen hundreds, 4 and shortly

afterwards the American jurisdictions followed suit, retaining only the much
maligned Dead Man's Statute in its place. Florida abolished the general
disqualification for interest by statute in 1874, copying verbatim the language of the earlier New York statute which provided for disqualification
of interested persons or parties only when the testimony offered was as
to a transaction or communication with a person since deceased or become

insane, and then only when the action was against the successor to the
unavailable person, usually either an executor or administrator or the committee of a lunatic.
The possibilities for litigation in such a statute are considerable and
have been adequately realized. Although the language of the various state
statutes is far from uniform, the problems that arise under them are

similar. Who is a party?6 Who is "interested"? 7 What is a "transaction
or communication"? Is the action one against the successor to the
deceased?' These and many similar problems have kept the courts busy
and the books full. Florida activity under this statute has been modest in
comparison with that of many other states, but it has been, nonetheless,
typical. That it has been modest only comparatively is evidenced by the

more than twenty pages of annotations which follow the statute in the
Florida Statutes Annotated.
4. 6 and 7 Viet., e. 85 (Lo
.rd Deninan's Act, 1843) abolished the interest disqualification for interested persons other than parties. 14 and 15 Vict., c. 99 (Lord
Brougharns Act, 1851) permitted parties to testify. See 2 Wk'igiore, EVIDENCE,
sec. 575 (3rd ed. 1940).
5. See. 829, New York Code Civ. Proc., now N.Y. Civ. PRoc. ACT, § 347.
The language of the Fla. and N.Y. statutes is no longer similar, both having undergone
various amendments, but the general tenor is still the same.
6. E.g., Stigletts v. McDonald, 137 Fla. 385, 186 So. 233 (1938), claimant in
interpleader is a party. Although the only evidence of a gift causa mortis was the
alleged donee's testimony of the transaction with the deceased, which was stricken
by the chancellor, nonetheless the finding of a gift was upheld on appeal which
indicates that the court gave some weight to the stricken testimony.
7. E.g., Fields v. Fields, 140 Fla. 269, 191 So. 512 (1939). A daughter is not
disqualified on grounds of "interest" in an action by her mother against the father's
estate. Bui see Fields v. Fields, 140 Fla. 323, 191 So. 827 (1939) where the same
mother is held interested and hence disqualified to testify on behalf of the same
daughter. Compare Brundige v. Bradley, 294 N.Y. 345, 62 N.E.2d 385, 386 (1945)
". . the applicability of the statute does not depend on whether the deceased
person's estate gains or loses by the outcome of the case." . .. with Parker v Priestley,
39 So.2d 210, 213 (Fla. 1949) " . . . the test of the interest of a witness .. .is whether
he will gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment."
Although these two definitions are not inconsistent, they are confusing to say the
least.
8. E.g., Terwilligar v. Ballard, 64 Fla. 158, 59 So. 244, 246 (1912). "Proofs
of payment to a deceased person may be made without violating the statutory or
common-law rules of evidence." But see Wicker v. Hampton, 104 Fla. 400, 140
So. 202 (1932) holding that payment is a transaction or communication within the
meaning of the statute. See also Thompson v. Harris, 148 Fla. 329, 4 So.2d 385
(1941); Madison v. Robinson, 95 Fla. 321, 116 So. 31 (1931); Lewis v. Meginniss,
30 Fla. 419, 12 So. 19 (1892).
9. E.g., Tharp v. Kitchell, 151 Fla. 226, 9 So.2d 457 (1942), communication
with deceased officer of corporation not within the statute.
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The statute has been roundly condemned by the experts. It has been
termed "archaic,"' 1 a breeder of "injustice and uncertainty,"" and according to Vigmore is subject to the same attacks that were leveled against
the general disqualification for interest. These are:
1. That the supposed danger of interested persons testifying falsely
exists to a limited extent only;
2. That, even so, yet, so far as they testify truly the exclusion is
an intolerable injustice;
3. That no exclusion can be so defined as to be rational, consistent and workable;
4. That in any case the test of cross examination and other safe12
guards for truth are a sufficient guaranty against false decision.
But it is still on the books of the majority of American jurisdictions
and it bids fair to remain there until something better is offered. Both
the Model Code and the Uniform Rules offer the same solution and in
identical language. 12 They abolish disqualifications and privileges and declare all relevant evidence admissible "Except as otherwise provided. .. ."
The Uniform Rules do not "otherwise provide" for the dead man situation
except to admit as a counterweight to the survivor's testimony and as an
exception to the hearsay rule "if the declarant is unavailable as a witness," a statement "narrating, describing or explaining an event or condition
which the judge finds was made by the declarant at a time when the
matter had been recently perceived by him and while his recollection was
clear, and was made in good faith prior to the commencement of the
action." 14 This in the opinion of the drafters is a "major reform."' 15 It
is doubtful if the legislatures will share their enthusiasm. The solution
they propose, along with several others, is being tried now by a few states.
These various solutions may be no worse than the Dead Man's Statute,'
but none is wholly satisfactory.
Touby, Evidence, 10

IAMI L.Q. 472, 478 (1956).
McCoaRMCK, EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 142 (1954).
12. 2 WICMORE, EVIDENCE, § 578, 696 (3rd ed. 1940).

10.

11.

13. Rule 9 of the Model Code, supra, and Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules, supra,

read: "Except as otherwise provided in these Rules,

(a)

every person is qualified to

be a witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness, and
(c) no person is disqualfied to testify to any matter, and (d) no person has a
privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any object or writing, and
(e) no person has a privilege that another shall not be a witness or shall not disclose
any matter or shall not produce any object or writing, and (f) all relevant evidence
is admissible."
14. UNIFORM Rumi.s or EVIDENCE (1953), Rule 63, (4), (c). Model Code
Rule 503 (a) contains no prerequisites of good faith or that the declarant made the
statement of his owu knowledge, and hence theoretically would provide a more liberal
exception than that of the Uniform Rules.
15. Ladd, Sympiosium on Uniform Rules, 10 RuTcERs L. REV. 523, 566 (1956):
"If piecemeal change of the law of evidence were to be attempted, the elimination
of the dead man's statute would be one of the first improvements to be made. A
draft of modem Uniform Rules of Evidence would be seriously defective if they
did not provide for its abolition."
16. Ibid. Dean Ladd argues that no state which has abolished the dead man's
statute has ever reenacted it.
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I shall consider the various proposals for reform further on in this
article, but first it seems well to inquire into the exact nature of the Dead
Man's Statute in an effort to see where the difficulty lies.
The almost universal distaste which the commentators display for the
Dead Man's Statute and the almost equally universal respect which the
legislatures seem to accord iti1 are best explained and reconciled by a
recognition of the dual function of the statute as it exists in nearly all
American jurisdictions. It does deal with "interest" and is a relic from
the Common Law past when all persons interested iu the outcome of
litigation were disqualified from testifying therein. To that extent the
commentators are correct. Merely because a person is interested should
be no ground for disqualification; his interest may be shown and the jury
should be permitted to consider his testimony for what it is worth. But
the real difficulty arises not from any interest the declarant may have, but
from the fact that his testimony is not normally subject to refutation, the
other party to the communication or transaction being dead. This aspect
of the statute has nothing to do with the qualification of the witness,
but is clearly concerned with the admissibility of relevant testimony. It
is a rule of exclusion and, as such, has much to recommend it. This distinction goes far to explain not only the disputes of the experts, but also
may account in some degree for the confusion of the cases construing the
statute itself,
One might say that the reason for the Dead Man Statute is similar to
the rule excluding hearsay. The latter is inadmissible because it cannot
be tested by cross examination; the former is suspect because it cannot
be tested by contradiction, the other party being dead. It is not solely
because interest is involved that we shrink from allowing a party to testify
to a communication or transaction with a deceased in an action against
the latter's estate. Of equal, or perhaps greater, weight is that such testimony is not subject to the principal safeguard for truth-contradiction.
The truth of the testimony offered, particularly if fraudulent, cannot be
questioned.
Let us look here at the attacks which were leveled against the general disqualification for interest and which, according to Wigmore,'" are
equally applicable to the Dead Man's Statute. The first is "that the supposed danger of interested persons testifying falsely exists to a limited
extent only." Granted-but we are not primarily concerned with interest;
we are really concerned with tests of reliability. Assuming that the sur-

17. Carr, The Proposed Missouri Evidence Code, 29 'l'EXAs L. REv. 627, 634
(1951). 'he Missouri Bar in a vote taken by its Board of Governors in 1949 on
the question-should the "dead man's statute" be repealed, voted "yes"-1338, "no"1467, a vote indicating the sharp division of opinion on the subject.

18. See note 12 supra.
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vivor is a most honest person, we cannot deny that his statement is only
half the fact, and that, as such, it may be dangerous to permit a jury to
speculate upon it. The second charge against the statute made by Wigmore
is "that even so, yet, so far as they testify truly the exclusion is an intolerable injustice." Again granted, but the question is, are they testifying
truly. Is the injustice greater in excluding half the truth than in admitting
but half? The third attack is "that no exclusion can be so defined as to
be rational, consistent and workable." This remains to be seen. The
drafters of the Uniform Rules believe that they have so defined the exclusion, by eliminating it and altering the law elsewhere. This is not an
exclusion, to be sure, but it is suggested that other alternatives exist once
one frees oneself from the indefensible concept of interest as a disqualification. The fourth argument against the Dead Man's Statute is conceded by Wigmore to be the weakest one' 9" . . . that in any case, the
test of cross examination and other safeguards for truth are a sufficient
guaranty against false decision." What other safeguards are there? And
how is cross examination to be effective against the skillful perjurer?
The solution provided by the Uniform Rules is to abolish the interest

qualification aspect of the statute and to admit the evidence, attempting
to justify the admission by offering an exception to the hearsay rule which
would admit statements made by the deceased. 2 This is the rule now
applicable in Connecticut,2 1 Massachusetts,

Dakota.

24

22

Rhode Island,23

and South

It apparently works as well as does the Dead Man's Statute. 2?

19. Ibid. Wigmore admits that there can be no contradiction, but, persisting
in regarding interest as the basis for the rule,' states ".

.

. since the deceased opponent

is a party, he would have been by hypothesis a potential liar equally with the disqualified survivor; so that the rule rests on the supposed lack of a questionable
species of testimony equally weak with that which is excluded. There never was
and never will be an exclusion on the score of interest which can be defended as
either logically or practically sound."
20. See note 14 supra.
21. CONN. REV. GEN. STAT. § 7895 (1949) admits declarations and memoranda
of deceased persons in actions by or against their representatives either favorable to
or adverse to the estate. The only requirement is relevancy.
22. MASS. ANN. LAws c. 233 § 65 (Supp. 1954) removes declaration of deceased
person from hearsay rule and husband and wife privilege if the court finds it made
in good faith and upon personal knowledge of declarant.
23. R.I. GEN. LAws c. 538 § 4, 5, 6 (1938). In an action against an executor
or administrator for the recovery of money where oral testimony of a statement or
promise of the deceased is offered, section 4 permits statements "written or oral"
and "evidence of his acts and habits of dealings tending to disprove or to show the
improbability of the making of such promise or statement shall be admissible."
Section 5 merely extends section 4 to cover anyone claiming title under or from the
deceased. Section 6 requires that declarations of the deceased must have been made
in good faith and upon personal knowledge.
24. S.D. CODE § 36.0104 (1939) Deceased persons testimony in actions by or
against personal representatives. In actions, suits, or proceedings by or against the
representatives of deceased persons including proceedings for the probate of wills, any
statement of the deceased whether oral or written shall not be excluded as hearsay,
provided that the trial judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made
by decedent, and that it was in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge.
25. See note 16 supra.
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But if we regard the opportunity to enter statements, if any, of the deceased as a balance to the positive testimony of the survivor, it is obvious
that our scales are out of order. The evidence of the survivor is still not
tested; the opportunity for error is reduced but slightly.
Rule 45 (b) of the Uniform Rules vests discretion in the judge to
exclude evidence where he finds its probative value outweighed by the
danger of misleading the jury. It is possible that this section might be
used to temper the inequity of the survivor's testimony in a proper case.
If so it would introduce into the Rules an element formerly tried in New
Hlampshirc26 and still present in Arizona " and in the hands of a courageous
judge might go far to protect decedents' estates from promiscuous plunder.
But it is doubtful if the drafters of the Uniform Rules intended any such
result, and it is even more doubtful that judges would be inclined to
exercise their discretion in many cases.
The requirement of corroboration of the survivor's testimony has been

used in several states 28 in an effort to balance the scales once the Dead
Man's Statute is eliminated. Corroboration certainly lends more credibility to the statements of the survivor. But if corroboration is available
the chances are that the survivor need not testify at all and thus the same
result would obtain whether the statute were in force or not. Certainly
the requirement of corroboration would not lessen tIle amount of litigation

arising from the interpretation of the statute. In every case the question
would still arise as to whether or not a dead man situation existed.
But all of the solutions which have been proposed still leave one
unsatisfied, The requircmelnt of corroboration is not an answer. Perjured

testimony can acquire perjured support.
contradiction.

We still miss the test of

26. By Chapter 182, Laws of 1953, New Hampshire abolished both its dead
man statute and the exception thereto vesting discretion in the court to allow the
testimony to avoid injustice and substituted therefor the present sections 516:22 and
516:25, N.H. REv. STATS. ANN. (1955). The effect of the change is to place New
Hampshire in line with the Uniform Rules. Section 516:25 is identical with S.D. CODE
§ 36.0104 (1939) supra note 24.
27. ARIZ. CoDE ANN. § 23-105 (1939) provides that in the dead man situation
"
. neither party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction
with or statement by the testator, intestate or ward unless called to testify thereto by
The last clause
the opposite party or required to testify thereto by the court ......
has been held to vest discretion in the court.
28. N.M. ST'AT. ANN. § 20-2-5 (1953) requires corroboration "by some other
material evidence." OuRE. RE v. STATS. 116.555 (1955) "No . . . claim which has been
rejected by the executor or administrator shall be allowed by any court except upon
some competent satisfactory evidence other than the testimony of the claimant."
no
CODE OF VA. § 8-286 (1950) provides that in the dead man situation ". ..
judgment or decree shall be rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded
on his uncorrobated testimony; and in any such action or suit, if such adverse party
testifies, all entries, memoranda, and declarations by the party so incapable of testifying made while lie was capable, relevant to the matter in issue, may be received
as evidence."
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The privilege of using the deceased's hearsay is an empty one if the
survivor is telling a bald-faced lie. It presumes that the deceased made
some positive statement about the transaction or communication allegedly
existing between him and the survivor. If no transaction occurred, .the
most the estate could offer would be proof of silence-too slight in probative value to be admitted under any circumstances. Thus where we need
it most, contradiction is impossible.
Assuming that rule 45 of the Uniform Rules could be used to permit
exclusion of doubtful testimony by a survivor, it is probable that the affirmative language of Rule 7 would inhibit the court from acting. In any event
inertia would be on the side of the survivor and the danger of error would
not be considerably lessened,
Of all the solutions heretofore proposed perhaps the best is one requiring the judge to use discretion, not to exclude, as would be the case if
Rule 45 were relied upon, but requiring his discretion to admit the testimony in the first place. This would place the burden upon the survivor
where it belongs, and would give the decedent's estate the benefit of any
29
judicial inertia that might exist.
But there is still one other way to look at this problem. It contains
elements of both the corroboration and discretion theories. Briefly, it is
this: treat the Dead Man's Statute as a privilege rather than a disqualification. After all, the statute, by its own terms, can be waived; it has many
of the aspects of a privilege, and certainly it is not and never has been
an absolute disqualification. Make it a privilege which must be claimed
by the estate in order to keep out the testimony of the survivor. So far
we are still with the dead man statute as it exists at present. But in
addition to making the estate claim the privilege, grant to the survivor the
right of introducing testimony as to his transaction or communication with
the deceased if the judge finds that sufficient other evidence has been
introduced to warrant a finding that the communication was in fact made.
This proposal is in line with Rule 28(2) (e) of the Uniform Rules which
permits an exception to the confidential communications privilege under
similar circumstances. Such a provision would not affect the hearsay exception granted the deceased's representatives by Rule 63 (4) (e) of the
Uniform Rules. It might read somewhat as follows:
Privilege of Personal Representative of Deceased
The personal representative of a deceased has a privilege, when
action is brought by or against the estate of the deceased, to pre29. See Catlett v. Chestnut, 107 Fla. 498, 146 So. 241 (1933) which implies
that "the rule ex necessitate rei" at common law allowed a woman's testimony to
prove a common law marriage with the deceased in an action against his estate,
despite her obvious interest. No such application of this rule, however, is found under
the Florida statute.

110
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vent any adverse party or interested person from testifying as to
any transaction or communication with the deceased; provided,
however, that if the judge finds that sufficient evidence, aside from
the transaction or communication, has been introduced to warrant
a finding that the communication was made or that the transaction
occurred, then such privilege may not be claimed.

I am aware that such a provision is 11o substitute for the test of contradiction, but unfortunately the dead are dead, and contradiction of a survivor's testimony frequently cannot be achieved other than by a ouija
board declaration.

